1. Introduction
When a company becomes insolvent, its remaining assets are often not enough to pay creditors in full. Clawback is the recovery of assets that were earlier transferred to another party, and it enlarges the pool available to creditors. The law rests on the pari passu principle, under which unsecured creditors of the same class share rateably in what is left, and it aims to stop a debtor from favouring some creditors, giving assets away or dissipating value in the period before formal insolvency. In Singapore, the relevant rules are in sections 224 to 227 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA). This article examines the two main heads of clawback, transactions at an undervalue and unfair preferences, and then covers defences, procedure, remedies, funding and the relationship between clawback claims and arbitration.
2. Who May Bring a Clawback Claim
The right to bring these claims belongs to the office holder, not to individual creditors. The claimants are the liquidator in a winding up, the judicial manager in a judicial management and the Official Assignee in bankruptcy, and the scheme channels claims through them so that recoveries benefit the general body of creditors and not one claimant alone. A creditor who suspects a vulnerable transaction should therefore inform the liquidator, who decides whether to pursue it after weighing the cost of litigation against the likely recovery. Where the estate lacks funds, a creditor may fund or indemnify the action.
3. Transactions at an Undervalue
A company enters a transaction at an undervalue if it makes a gift, receives no consideration, or receives consideration whose value is significantly less than the value of what it gave. A common example is a director selling a company asset to a relative or related company at a price far below market value. The provision looks at the objective effect on the company’s asset position, so fraud or concealment need not be shown, and the parties’ state of mind matters only to the statutory defence.
The liquidator must prove two elements: a gift or a significant disparity in value, and that the company was insolvent at the time or became insolvent because of the transaction. The disparity is shown by comparing the market value of what was given with what the company received. Insolvency is harder to prove, so the IRDA presumes it where the other party is a connected person.
The transaction must fall within three years before the commencement of the winding up, whether or not the counterparty is connected.
The court will not make an order if the company entered the transaction in good faith, for the purpose of carrying on its business, and there were reasonable grounds at the time for believing that it would benefit the company. Contemporaneous evidence such as board minutes, valuations or advice obtained at the time supports this defence. Consider a company that accepts SGD 300,000 from a debtor in settlement of a SGD 1 million debt. By giving up SGD 700,000, it may have conferred a benefit on the debtor for far less than its value. If the debtor was in serious financial difficulty and the part payment was meant to limit further loss, the court may find the transaction was made in the company’s interest and decline to set it aside.
4. Unfair Preferences
A company gives an unfair preference when the recipient is its creditor, surety or guarantor, and the company does or allows something that puts that person in a better position on an insolvent winding up than otherwise. Examples include repaying a director’s loan in full shortly before insolvency while other unsecured creditors go unpaid, or granting fresh security to an existing creditor.
Four elements must be established. First, the recipient is a creditor or guarantor of the company’s debts or liabilities, which is usually easy to show through contracts. Second, the company was insolvent when the preference was given or became insolvent because of it. Third, the recipient ended up in a better position than it would have had on liquidation, which is shown by proving that it received more than it would have under a liquidator’s distribution. Fourth, the company was influenced by a desire to prefer the recipient.
Insolvency is assessed mainly by the cash flow test, which asks whether current liabilities exceed current assets so that the company cannot meet debts falling due within twelve months. A temporary shortage of liquidity is not enough, and prospects of fresh capital or shareholder support must be considered. Unlike for undervalue transactions, insolvency is not presumed for preferences, even where the recipient is a connected person, so the liquidator must prove it. The Court of Appeal has clarified that connected persons include associates of the company and associates of its directors. An associate of a director may be the director’s spouse, relative, business partner, employer, employee or trustee, and two companies controlled by the same person may be associates of each other.
The desire to prefer is a matter of state of mind and is ordinarily difficult to prove. For a connected person, the IRDA presumes the desire, and the burden shifts to the recipient to rebut it. For an unconnected person, it is enough that the desire was one of the factors influencing the company, even if it was not the dominant one.
The case of BIT Baltic Investment & Trading Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v Wee See Boon illustrates the point. The company’s former director approved payments of USD 1,472,500 to two related companies that were its creditors under service agreements. The payments left the company with net liabilities of USD 1,132,751, and it also owed another creditor SGD 1,805,568.10, so the two recipients would not have been paid in full on a winding up. Because the recipients were associates, a desire to prefer was presumed, and the defendant did not try to rebut it. The court held the payments were unfair preferences.
The look-back period is two years where the preference was given to a connected person and one year in any other case.
5. Relevant Time and Insolvency Requirement
Both heads are limited to a relevant time, measured back from the commencement of the winding up or judicial management. The periods are three years for undervalue transactions, two years for preferences to connected persons and one year for other preferences. Falling within the period is necessary but not enough. The company must also have been unable to pay its debts at the time, or have become unable to do so as a result of the transaction. For related-party undervalue transactions, this requirement is presumed to be met unless the contrary is shown, so a connected recipient of an undervalue transaction is presumed to have dealt with an insolvent company, while a connected recipient of a preference faces only the presumption of a desire to prefer.
6. Good Faith Protection
Even where an order is made, section 227(3) protects a person who acquired an interest in the property from someone other than the company in good faith and for value. A person who received a benefit in good faith and for value is also generally not required to pay, unless that person was a party to the transaction or was paid as a creditor. The direct counterparty therefore cannot rely on this protection. A counterparty that knew of the insolvency, for example by being aware that a liquidator had been appointed, cannot claim to have acted in good faith. Connected persons are presumed not to have acted in good faith unless the contrary is shown, and the same presumption applies to a person who had notice of the relevant surrounding circumstances and of the insolvency proceedings. Arm’s-length dealing for a genuine commercial reason, without knowledge of the company’s distress, improves the recipient’s prospects.
7. Procedure and Interim Relief
The office holder cannot recover the asset by self-help and must apply to court, typically by originating application in the General Division of the High Court. The process usually begins with an investigation of the company’s books and bank records for the look-back period, often with forensic accountants, and the liquidator then commonly writes to the counterparty seeking voluntary repayment, which can avoid litigation. If the matter is not resolved, an application is filed with a supporting affidavit setting out the transaction, the relevant time and any presumptions relied on. The respondent may argue that the transaction was outside the relevant time, that the company was solvent, that there was no desire to prefer, or that the good faith defence applies. The court generally decides the application on affidavit evidence unless cross-examination is directed.
Evidence should be preserved early, and where dissipation is a real risk, a freezing injunction may be sought to hold assets pending trial. Assets that are dissipated before judgment cannot be recovered however strong the claim.
8. Remedies and Distribution
Section 227 gives the court wide remedial powers. The court may order property to be vested back in the company, order payment of a sum for benefits received, release or discharge security given by the company, and revive obligations of a surety or guarantor that were released. The remedy is restorative and not punitive, and its aim is to return the company to the position it would have occupied had the transaction not occurred. Where the original asset cannot be returned, the court can order a money payment instead.
Sums recovered do not go to any one creditor. They join the general pool and are applied in the statutory order of priority. Costs and expenses of the liquidation are met first, and the balance is paid to preferential creditors, such as employees, the CPF Board and the Comptroller of Income Tax, before ordinary unsecured creditors. Set-off may reduce the net recovery from a counterparty that is itself a creditor of the estate.
Clawback sits alongside other liabilities. A director may be personally liable for fraudulent trading, which requires proof of intent to defraud creditors or a fraudulent purpose, and for wrongful trading, where the company incurs debts without reasonable prospect of repaying them. Fraudulent trading also carries criminal consequences, including a fine of up to SGD 15,000 or imprisonment of up to seven years, or both.
9. Funding Clawback Claims
An estate with no cash may be unable to pursue a valid claim, and the courts and the IRDA now provide routes for creditor and third-party funding. In Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 597, the High Court held that a liquidator’s power of sale extends to the proceeds of a cause of action. Re Fan Kow Hin [2019] 3 SLR 861 applied that reasoning to the assignment of proceeds of clawback claims by a trustee in bankruptcy.
Under section 144(1)(g), a liquidator may assign the proceeds of claims for undervalue transactions and unfair preferences, among others, with court approval or the consent of the committee of inspection. Regulations require notice to all creditors and a right of first refusal to fund, and the funder may not influence the conduct of the claim. Under section 204(3), the court may, on a funding creditor’s application, give the funder priority over other creditors in respect of assets recovered or preserved through the funding, and the order may be sought in advance, before the funding is provided. In Re Mingda Holding Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 130, the court approved a waterfall under which the funder recovered its costs and 100% of its admitted debt ahead of other creditors, as funding was the only realistic route to recovery. In Majestica, recoveries after repayment of the funding were instead split 75% to the funder and 25% to the other unsecured creditors. The liquidator must keep control of the litigation, and the funder’s return must be proportionate to its risk. Judicial managers have a similar power to assign such proceeds to third-party funders.
10. Clawback and Arbitration: Kardachi v Mishra [2025] SGHC 218
The General Division of the High Court recently considered how clawback claims interact with arbitration in Kardachi, Jason Aleksander v Deepak Mishra. The private trustees of the bankruptcy estate of Mr Rajesh Bothra had commenced proceedings over 14 disposals of assets or cash to Mr Mishra, his wife and related companies. They alleged that the disposals were undervalue transactions, unfair preferences, void post-bankruptcy disposals, fraudulent conveyances or shams, and obtained summary judgment on three of the claims. Mr Mishra then began arbitration, alleging that the trustees had breached a duty of good faith under a Waiver Agreement by bringing the clawback claims and using documents he had supplied.
The court made three findings. First, leave of court is needed to commence proceedings against bankruptcy trustees, including by arbitration and in respect of contracts the trustees themselves made. The requirement filters out frivolous and costly claims that would drain the estate, and section 420(2) of the IRDA, which concerns enforceability of an arbitration clause, does not remove it. Second, leave was refused because no prima facie arguable case had been shown. The Waiver Agreement contained no express duty of good faith, and its entire agreement clause, which excluded any terms being included or implied, was clear enough to exclude an implied duty. Singapore law also recognises no general duty of good faith implied in law.
Third, no case management stay was granted in favour of arbitration. Clawback actions are brought for the benefit of the estate and creditors as a whole, and the public policy protecting that interest outweighs the policy of enforcing arbitration clauses. Whether an insolvency practitioner may bring clawback claims is therefore not arbitrable. The court added that a stay would be unjust because assets have already been allegedly dissipated once, creating a real risk of further dissipation during the stay.
11. Conclusion
The IRDA allows an office holder to recover value that left a company shortly before its insolvency, whether through an undervalue transaction within three years or an unfair preference within one or two years. The statutory presumptions against connected persons place the burden on insiders, who are best placed to explain such dealings. The defences protect genuine commercial dealings and good faith counterparties. Funding mechanisms make claims viable for estates with no cash. Kardachi v Mishra confirms that these claims are not displaced by arbitration agreements and that leave is required before suing bankruptcy trustees.